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Abstract—Threat Image Projection (TIP) is a technique used
in X-ray security baggage screening systems that superimposes
a threat object signature onto a benign X-ray baggage image
in a plausible and realistic manner. It has been shown to be
highly effective in evaluating the ongoing performance of human
operators, improving their vigilance and performance on threat
detection. However, with the increasing use of 3D Computed
Tomography (CT) in aviation security for both hold and cabin
baggage screening a significant challenge arises in extending
TIP to 3D CT volumes due to the difficulty in 3D CT volume
segmentation and the proper insertion location determination. In
this paper, we present an approach for 3D TIP in CT volumes
targeting realistic and plausible threat object insertion within
3D CT baggage images. The proposed approach consists of
dual threat (source) and baggage (target) volume segmentation,
particle swarm optimisation based insertion determination and
metal artefact generation. In addition, we propose a TIP quality
score metric to evaluate the quality of generated TIP volumes.
Qualitative evaluations on real 3D CT baggage imagery show
that our approach is able to generate realistic and plausible TIP
which are indiscernible from real CT volumes and the TIP quality
scores are consistent with human evaluations.
Index Terms—threat image projection, X-ray computed to-
mography, CT volume segmentation, baggage security screening,
particle swarm optimisation, TIP quality score
I. INTRODUCTION
Scanning passenger baggage using X-ray technology is a
mandatory process in airports and other public transportation
for security. Although automatic threat material and prohibited
item detection using advanced machine learning techniques
have been studied [5], [4], [39], they have not yet achieved
maturity whereby human operators can be completely re-
placed. As such the performance of human operators can
vary depending on experience, fatigue and baggage item
complexity. Threat Image Projection (TIP) is a technique
applied in X-ray image based baggage screening systems to
monitor the ongoing performance of human operators. TIP
is used to generate plausible and realistic X-ray baggage
images containing threat signatures (e.g., firearms, improvised
explosive devices, etc.) by projecting fictional threat object
images onto X-ray images of real passenger bags present
within the live aviation security process. It is a little known
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fact that TIP is a legally mandated process by both national
and international aviation security regulations [2], [1].
Using TIP in X-ray security scanners has been shown to be
effective in improving the vigilance and attention of human
operators, hence improving the overall performance of threat
detection [18], [10]. The benefits of TIP systems are multi-
fold. TIP systems make it possible for operators to encounter
baggage images with threat objects more frequently during
their regular working patterns by randomly applying TIP to be-
nign passenger bags so that they can get familiar with potential
real yet rare threats in order to improve their detection ability
[10]. Research also suggests operators are motivated and more
attentive to do well when knowing that TIP systems are
enabled and their performance is monitored [2]. In addition,
TIP systems record the performance of individual operators
such that his information could be further analysed and used
to customize training plans.
These benefits, however, are only achievable if TIP systems
are properly used and managed [10]. For example, it is
important how frequently an operator should be exposed to TIP
during their work pattern. On the other hand, the management
of TIP library is critical to the effectiveness of TIP systems.
According to [2], the TIP library shall contain a minimum
of 1,000 virtual images and 250 threat objects captured in
different orientations. The TIP library needs to be updated each
year with no fewer than 100 virtual images replaced with new
ones. To satisfy these requirements, an effective algorithm of
plausible and realistic TIP image generation is crucial.
Recently, 3D Computed Tomography (CT) scanners have
seen increasing deployment in airports for baggage screening
[19]. A recent study in [17] shows the superior performance
of threat detection using 3D CT imaging against traditional
2D X-ray images. However, 3D TIP within CT volumes is
still a very challenging problem due to a number of additional
factors. Firstly, some form of 3D CT volume segmentation
is required to both isolate the bounds of the 3D threat object
(source) and the exterior boundary and internal void regions of
the 3D baggage item (target). Most CT volume segmentation
algorithms are targeted at medical images [21] which can not
be readily applied to baggage volumes [24]. Secondly, inserted
threat objects have to avoid intersection with existing items in
the target baggage volume and additionally exhibit artefacts
consistency with those of the original scanned objects already
present therein. [25].
To address aforementioned issues in 3D TIP, we extend the
work in [25] and present a novel approach for fully automatic
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2threat image projection within 3D CT security imagery. Our
approach consists of four components: threat isolation, void
determination, object insertion optimisation and metal artefact
generation. Specifically, a threat volume is segmented into the
background, threat body and uncertain regions (threat isola-
tion), whilst a baggage volume is segmented into background,
inner-void and bag-content regions (void determination). The
segmentation results are used to evaluate the quality of a
given insertion location and orientation. The optimal insertion
is derived by particle swarm optimisation (object insertion
optimisation). Finally, metal artefact generation [26] is applied
to the generated TIP to enhance the plausibility. In summary,
the paper has the following contributions:
- it is among the first attempts to address the threat image
projection in 3D CT volumes to our best knowledge;
- the proposed framework integrates 3D object segmenta-
tion and particle swarm optimisation algorithms towards
the generation of realistic and plausible threat image
projection;
- the proposed approach has been validated on real baggage
data collected from airports and the experimental results
demonstrate its effectiveness from both qualitative and
quantitative perspectives.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: prior
works relevant to 2D and 3D TIP are reviewed in Section II;
we present details of our approach for 3D TIP in Section III;
qualitative evaluations of each component in our approach are
given in Section IV; finally, we discuss limitations existing in
the current approach and potential directions of future work
in Section V and conclude the paper in Section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
In this section, we make a thorough review of TIP related
works including those focusing on 2D and 3D imagery.
A. 2D TIP
The concept of threat image projection in X-ray imagery
dates back to 1990s towards the enhancement of X-ray bag-
gage screening performance in airports [31], [15]. As TIP
within 2D imagery is essentially to superimpose a threat X-ray
image onto a baggage X-ray image in a random position, it is
a relatively simple technique in terms of contemporary image
processing. As a result, literature on 2D TIP mainly focused
on the system design [32], [16] or performance evaluation
[18], [10], [31], [15] rather than image processing details. For
example, Neiderman et al. [32] designed and patented a means
for training and testing baggage screening operators using the
2D TIP technique. An exception is [16] in which the authors
presented the details of combining distorted threat images
with baggage images to generate realistic and diverse TIP. In
addition, our recent work [8], focusing on the investigation
of TIP based data augmentation for object detection in X-ray
baggage images, also provides some details of viable 2D TIP
gleaned from various obfuscated sources [32], [16], [34].
Except for baggage screening, 2D TIP was also applied
in video surveillance [33], [12] and cargo screening systems
[34]. Neil et al. [33] discussed the challenge and plausibility
of applying TIP in video surveillance. Donald et al. [13]
further discussed how TIP (or IGO, Inserted Graphic Objects)
could improve vigilance performance, target incident detection
rate, and design considerations for TIP images in video
surveillance. Quantitative evaluations conducted by Donald
[12], however, disclosed IGO were not effective in enhancing
the detection of significant events in video surveillance. The
reason, as discussed by the author, could be multifold and
applying TIP in video streams is quite different from doing it
in X-ray images.
Rogers et al. [34] applied X-ray TIP techniques in cargo
screening tasks. They proposed a framework extracting threat
masks from X-ray images and projecting them onto benign X-
ray images to generate realistic TIP. Quantitative evaluations
indicated the generated TIP and real X-ray images containing
threats were indistinguishable. In addition, transformations
were made to inject variation into the threat signatures to
generate a very large number of realistic TIP data for training
deep learning based object detection algorithms. Among seven
types of transformations employed in [34], threat insertion
position and rotation are also used in our approach. The
employment of such transformation in our approach aims
to improve the plausibility of generated TIP which is not a
problem in 2D TIP, while in [34], the transformation aims to
diversify generated TIP for data augmentation.
B. 3D TIP
Early attempts were made to extend 2D X-ray TIP to 3D
TIP but unsuccessful due to obvious visual imaging artifacts
which could provide cues for scanner operators to readily
recognize the presence of TIP [40]. To address this issue,
Yildiz et al. [40] proposed to project threat objects into the
sinogram space instead of the original imagery space. They
claimed plausible TIP could be generated but their insertion
positions were manually decided and the evaluations were
conducted on uncluttered image examples without explicit
metal artefact generation. Megherbi et al. [25] proposed an
approach to fully automatic 3D TIP and applied it to densely
cluttered 3D CT baggage volumes (which is subsequently
identified as prior work in the commercial implementations of
[9], [14]). The approach consisted of three main components:
void determination, object insertion location determination and
metal artefacts generation. The work presented in this paper
is based on [25] but with notable variations and improvement
within the stages of threat isolation and object insertion.
III. AUTOMATIC 3D THREAT IMAGE PROJECTION
Our approach to 3D threat image projection is composed of
four parts: threat isolation, void determination, object insertion
optimisation and metal artefact generation. The framework of
our approach is illustrated in Figure 1.
Threat isolation aims to segment threat objects from the
background in threat volumes Ithr. These threat objects of
interest are prepared beforehand and scanned in a controlled
condition (e.g. background voxels with lower values than
threat object voxels) for easy segmentation. The subsequent
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Fig. 1. The framework of proposed 3D threat image projection approach; given a threat CT volume and a baggage CT volume as inputs, a plausible TIP
is generated as the output of the approach with the pipeline consisting of four components: threat isolation, void determination, object insertion optimisation
and metal artefact generation.
thresholding and morphological operations used in our ap-
proach will be described in the following subsection.
Void determination aims to segment baggage CT volumes
Ibag into three regions: outer region, inner void and bag
content. Different costs will be incurred when the threat
object is projected into these three regions. As a result, bag
volume segmentation results in a projection cost map of the
bag volume indicating the cost of voxels onto which the
threat object is projected. With the segmented threat object
and the projection cost map of a bag volume, the insertion
is boiled down to an optimisation problem which aims to
find optimal insertion locations and threat object orientations.
Particle swarm optimisation [20] is used in our approach as
one of the enabling techniques. To enhance the plausibility of
the generated TIP volume, we apply metal artefact generation
[26] as post processing to generate plausible metal artefacts
in the TIP volume.
In the following subsections, we will present four parts of
our threat image projection approach in more detail.
A. Threat Isolation
A variety of threat objects including firearms and impro-
vised explosive devices could be used to generate TIP. To make
segmentation easy and accurate, we assume the threat objects
are scanned in controlled conditions. Every threat object will
be scanned individually with only low-density supporting
objects (e.g., foam) if necessary. As a result, threat object
volumes (source) are almost free of noise except when metal
components exist in the threat objects themselves. Special care
needs to be taken to get rid of any residual artefact noise
surrounding the body of the threat object.
The pipeline of our threat isolation is shown in Figure 2. It
takes a threat volume as the input and outputs a cropped 3D
volume of the threat object which is ready to be inserted in
a benign bag volume target for TIP generation. CT volumes
contain noise with small non-zero voxel values in the void
region. To remove the effects of such noise, in the first step
of threat isolation, we set a threshold value to binarise the
input CT volume. Whilst this simple thresholding process will
isolate the threat object in most cases, there could be special
A slice of Input volume Binarization Largest connected component Dilation
Region growing Dilation OutputDistance map
Fig. 2. The pipeline of threat isolation algorithm; slices of a CT volume
of a source item bottle is used here for illustration while the segmentation
algorithm is actually applied to 3D CT volumes which are segmented into
three regions: the threat body region in yellow, the background in blue and
the uncertain region in a gradient colour.
cases where the threat objects have an internal sub-void which
should be considered as a part of the threat object. In addition,
there could exist more significant noise in the CT volume
which can not be removed by such simple thresholding. To
handle these special cases, we develop a robust threat isolation
approach advancing upon that of [25].
Specifically, connected component labelling (CCL) [35] is
applied to the binary volume derived from the thresholding
process. The resulting labelled connected components could
belong to either the threat object or background noise. Due
to the fact that the noise components have far fewer voxels
than the threat object, we only reserve the largest labelled
connected component as the segmented threat object. As such
we have successfully removed the noise in the volume but the
resulted threat object can still have an internal void. To ensure
that internal voids are treated as a part of the threat object, we
try to conversely determine the exterior boundary of the threat
object. Subsequently, the threat object including the possible
void space inside can be derived accordingly. For this purpose,
we use a region growing method [3] to segment the exterior
region in a threat volume. The region growing seed is usually
set to the upper-left upper-leftmost voxel such that this will
not be a theat object voxel within a controlled condition CT
image scan. To use region growing the threat boundary should
4be closed so that the region cannot mistakenly grow into the
threat object. To this end, we apply morphological dilation
to the isolated threat component derived from the connected
component labelling in the previous step.
Region growing is able to segment the non-threat (back-
ground) region in the threat volume (source). To reduce
the noise surrounding the threat body, a dilation operation
is applied to the non-threat region. The dilation operation
transforms the voxels close to the threat boundary into the
background and effectively removes some noisy voxels from
the threat object. However, it could also lead to damage to
the true voxels of the threat object. To alleviate this issue,
we consider the voxels removed by the background dilation
form an uncertain region since the voxels of this region could
belong to the threat object or be noise.
Now the threat volume is segmented into three parts: the
threat object, the uncertain region and the background. A
minimum 3D volume of the threat object is cropped and
most of the background region is removed. To facilitate the
presentation, we use Ithr to denote the cropped 3D volume
of a threat object and a 3D indicator matrix M thr is used
to represent the segmentation results. The element value of
M thr(i, j, k) is determined as follows:
M thr(i, j, k) =

1, threat object,
1/d2ijk, uncertain region,
0, background.
(1)
where dijk is the distance of voxel (i, j, k) to the boundary
of the threat object, which can be calculated by distance
transform method proposed by Maurer et al. [23]. Equation (1)
results in a 3D volume composed of three different regions:
threat body voxels indicated by ones, background voxels with
zero values and uncertain voxels in the range of 0 − 1.
The indicator matrix M thr will serve as a weight matrix to
extract the threat object from the original CT volume for TIP
generation. The uncertain voxels far from the threat object will
have lower weights so that the sharp transition effect can be
alleviated when inserting the threat into a benign bag volume.
As a result, the resultant TIP look more plausible by using the
indicator matrix in Eq. (1) for initial threat isolation.
B. Void Determination
To insert the segmented threat into a plausible location in the
bag volume, we require to understand different regions in the
bag volume. We propose a bag volume segmentation method
to segment a bag volume into: outer-bag (background), bag-
content and inner-void regions. Similar to the threat volume
segmentation, the pipeline of bag volume segmentation is
composed of several morphological operations as illustrated
in Figure 3. The pipeline takes a 3D CT volume as input
and outputs a indicator matrix representing the segmentation
results.
A similar approach to threat volume segmentation is used
here to segment the background region of bag volumes.
The original CT volume is firstly binarised by thresholding.
Subsequently, the largest connected component is extracted by
3D CCL as the volume of a bag which is further dilated to
A slice of input volume Binarization Largest connected component Dilation
OutputThresholding: inner-voidDilationRegion growing
Fig. 3. The pipeline of void determination algorithm (left to right, top to
bottom); slices of a 3D CT volume of a suitcase are used for illustration while
the algorithm is actually applied to 3D CT volumes which are segmented into
three regions: the outer-bag region in blue, the inner-void region in green and
the bag-content region in red.
ensure the boundary is closed. The background is segmented
by region growing from a random seed (usually set as the
upper left most voxel) outside the volume of the bag.
To segment a volume of bag into an inner-void region and
a bag-content region, a simple thresholding is applied so that
voxels of smaller values than the threshold form the inner-void
region and others form the bag-content region.
We use Ibag to denote the 3D volume matrix of a bag
volume Ibag and subsequently the segmentation results can
be represented by a 3D projection cost map M bag as follows:
M bag(i, j, k) =
 0, inner-void,v˜ijk, bag-content,
c, outer-bag.
(2)
where c is a large positive constant indicating that a big cost
will be incurred if threat object is projected to the outer-
bag region, and v˜ijk = Ibag(i, j, k) × c/m denotes the cost
of projecting onto bag-content voxels which is equal to the
normalized intensity value of voxel (i, j, k) where m is the
maximum voxel density value in the CT volume.
C. Object Insertion Optimization
Inserting a segmented threat object into a benign bag in the
3D CT imagery involves the determination of optimal insertion
locations and orientations. To enable plausible and realistic
TIP, it is important to find suitable locations in a benign bag
and proper orientations of the threat object. Ideally, we tend
to insert a threat object into the inner-void region in the bag
volume. In cases where a large void region is available in the
benign bag, we need to consider the effect of gravity and insert
it into a lower position so that the inserted threat object will
not appear to implausibly levitate unsupported. In practice,
however, most baggage is cluttered without enough void space
for big threat objects. In these cases we allow the threat object
to be inserted into regions where voxel intensities are low.
Regions of low voxel values are usually occupied by clothes
and it is highly plausible to have a threat object concealed in
clothes within baggage. In our TIP framework, we formulate
5an optimization problem to ensure optimal insertions and use
Particle Swarm Optimization (PSO) [20] to solve the problem.
Once the optimal location and orientation have been derived,
a simple blending approach is employed to project the threat
object into the bag volume and generate a final TIP volume
output.
1) Optimizing Insertion Location and Orientation: Finding
an optimal insertion location and orientation is essentially an
optimization problem. The variables to optimize are denoted
by Θ = {x, y, z, α, β, γ}, where x, y, z are the insertion
coordinates within the volume of bag (target) and α, β, γ
are the rotation angles of the threat object (source) within
three planes (yz, xz and xy). We use M˜ thr to denote the 3D
volume matrix after rotating M thr by angles of α, β, γ within
three planes.
M˜ thr = f(M thr|α, β, γ) (3)
where f(·) is a rotation function which could be implemented
by spline interpolation [37], [38]. We use M˜ bag to denote a
3D volume cropped from the projection cost map M bag of the
bag volume. The cropping is conditioned on the coordinates
x, y, z and the size of rotated threat volume M˜ thr:
M˜ bag = g(M bag|x, y, z,∆x,∆y,∆z) (4)
where g(·) represents the cropping process, ∆x,∆y,∆z are
sizes of the cropped 3D volume and equal to those of the
rotated threat volume M˜ thr.
The objective of the optimization problem is formulated as
follows:
min
Θ
||M tip||1 + λ1||M˜ tip||1 + λ2y (5)
where
M˜ tip(i, j, k) = H(M tip(i, j, k)− c′) (6)
and
M tip = M˜ thr  M˜ bag. (7)
H(·) in Eq. (6) is a unit step function applied to all elements of
M tip so that M˜ tip(i, j, k) = 1 when M tip(i, j, k) is greater
than the constant parameter c′, otherwise 0. The operator
 between two matrices in Eq. (7) denotes the Hadamard
product. The operator || · ||1 in Eq. (5) is the entrywise
matrix 1-norm which calculates the sum over the absolute
values of all elements in a matrix; λ1 and λ2 are two hyper-
parameters adjusting the weights of different terms in the
objective function.
Minimizing the first term in Eq. (5) ensures the threat
object to be inserted in a region with the lowest average voxel
intensity. However, it could result in a solution where small
volumes of high-intensity voxels close to the low-intensity
region are selected. Such regions may have the lowest average
intensities but make the insertion less plausible. For example,
the threat may be inserted into an empty corner of a bag but
with a small part outside the bag. To address this issue, we
have the second item in Eq. (5) which aims to minimize the
number of voxels whose values are greater than a threshold c
in the selected bag regions. The third item aims to limit the
coordinate value in the direction of gravity so that it tends to
insert the threat object in a lower location within the bag.
Algorithm 1 Particle Swarm Optimisation for Optimal Inser-
tion
Input: 3D indicator matrix M thr from threat volume seg-
mentation, 3D projection cost map M bag from bag vol-
ume segmentation, inertia weight w, cognitive parameter
c1, social parameter c2, number of particles N .
Output: Optimal insertion location and orientation Θ∗ =
{x∗, y∗, z∗, α∗, β∗, γ∗}.
Set t = 0 and randomly initialise Θ0i and V
0
i for i =
1, 2, ..., N ;
while t ≤ T do
t← t+ 1;
Calculate cost[i] using Eq. (5) for i = 1, 2, ..., N ;
Find Θbesti and Θ
best according to the calculated cost;
Update velocities of particles using Eq. (9);
Update Θt using Eq. (8) for each particle;
end while
Output Θbest as Θ∗.
2) Particle Swarm Optimization: To solve the problem
defined in Eq. (5), one of the enabling methods is particle
swarm optimization (PSO) [20], [29]. To make this paper
self-contained, we briefly describe the PSO method under our
problem setting. The swarm is first initialised with N particles
{Θi0}Ni=1, where each Θi is a vector of six variables. The aim
is to find the optimal Θ∗ minimizing the objective function
defined in Eq. (5) after T iterations. In the t-th iteration, we
update the i-th particle Θit as follows:
Θti = Θ
t−1
i + V
t
i , i = 1, 2, ..., N, (8)
where
V ti = wV
t−1
i + c1r1(Θ
best
i −Θt−1i ) + c2r2(Θbest −Θt−1i )
(9)
is the velocity of i-th particle in the t-th iteration; w,c1 and
c2 are the inertia weight, cognitive and social parameters
respectively [36], [7]; r1 and r2 are random numbers drawn
from a uniform distribution for each particle in each iteration;
Θbesti and Θ
best are the best position of i-th particle and
the best position of the swarm (i.e. all particles) thus far
respectively.
After T iterations of Eq. (8-9), the optimal variables Θ∗ =
{x∗, y∗, z∗, α∗, β∗, γ∗} can be obtained and are ready to use
for threat insertion. The algorithm is shown in Algorithm 1.
3) Image Blending: Given the optimal insertion location
and orientation, a TIP volume can be generated by inserting
the segmented threat object volume into the bag volume after
rotating it to the optimal orientation. Recall that the segmented
threat volume is denoted as Ithr, it is firstly weighted by the
indicator matrix M thr such that intensity values of voxels in
the uncertain region are attenuated. We use the same rotation
function f(·) in Eq. (3) and the optimal angles derived from
PSO to rotate the weighted threat volume:
I˜thr = f(Ithr  M˜ thr|α∗, β∗, γ∗). (10)
The insertion is an image blending process within 3D imagery
in which we modify the values of relevant voxels in the
6original bag volume Ibag according to the insertion location
and rotated volume of the threat. Different methods can be
employed for the purpose of image blending. One simple yet
effective method is to add the threat volume matrix I˜thr to the
sub-volume matrix of Ibag , where the sub-volume is specified
by the optimal position x∗,y∗ and y∗.
D. TIP Quality Score
Given a threat volume and a baggage volume, our approach
is able to generate a TIP volume which may be of variable
comparative realism and plausibility given all possible un-
constrained combinations of inputs. On one hand, it is well
known that particle swarm optimisation could lead to a local
best solution [6]. On the other hand, more importantly, a given
baggage volume may just not be suitable for a given randomly
selected threat to be inserted as the threat is physically too
large (e.g. large firearm threat volume into small handbag
target volume). As a result, it is important to have a metric
evaluating the quality of a TIP generated volume without
manual review. Operationally, this can be used to reject poor
quality TIP volumes before the are presented to an operator
as part of a TIP based performance evaluation system.
We propose the TIP quality score to evaluate the quality of
generated TIP volumes. Specifically, we use the cost defined
in Eq. (5 and normalise it with the volume of inserted threat.
The normalised cost value can be easily transformed into a
score in the range of 0− 100 using the following equation:
score = max(0,min(100, f(cost))) (11)
where f is a monotonically decreasing function which could
be selected based on the specific requirement of the TIP
quality. In our experiment, we use a simple linear function
f(cost) = 100− 0.01× cost. (12)
E. Metal Artefact Generation
The problem of metal artefacts in X-ray CT images is well
studied in medical imaging applications [22], [28], [27]. Metal
artefacts are caused by the presence of high-density objects in
the scan field of view. The origin of metal artefacts has been
studied extensively in the literature and several assumptions
have been made [30]. Regardless of the origin of metal
artefacts, the effects of these artefacts in the reconstructed
CT volumes are the same. Metal artefacts appear as dark and
white streaks radiating from the metal objects and spreading
across the whole reconstructed CT volumes [26]. They are
more prominent near the metal objects and are a function of
scan orientation and the material content (see Figure 4).
To enhance the plausibility of generated TIP, it is necessary
to take into consideration metal artefacts in the TIP process
so that the threat objects appear as if they were genuinely
located in the scanned bag. Our proposed metal artefact
generation (MAG) procedure depicted in Figure 5 is inspired
by the established metal artefact reduction (MAR) projection-
replacement techniques in medical imaging applications [28],
[27]. In a similar vein to these methods, the whole process of
MAG is based on a sequence of 2D slices of a 3D CT volume.
Fig. 4. CT Metal artefacts in a CT slice of a cluttered baggage.
It starts by mapping the original slices of the benign bag
(harmless passenger bag), its metal-only slices and the metal-
only slices of the artefact-free threat object to the projection
domain via the Radon transform [11]. The output of this step
is known as a sinogram image.
The artefact free 3D CT volume of a threat object is
obtained by appropriate thresholding to remove artefacts and
noise. The metal-only volume of a benign bag and the artefact-
free threat object are obtained by segmenting the metal objects
in their original CT volume by thresholding using a suitable
metal CT intensity threshold. This step exploits the fact that
metal objects in CT volumes have higher density compared
to other objects. Subsequently, the metal traces corresponding
to the metal objects of the benign bag and the metal part of
the artefact-free threat object are combined in one projection
volume. A mask corresponding to all the metal traces is
marked in the sinogram of the benign bag CT volume. In
conventional MAR projection-replacement based methods, this
mask corresponds to the corrupted area in which projection
bins are affected by metallic objects and which need to be
replaced by surrogate data. Marking this corrupted area in
the Radon domain is equivalent to marking all rays passing
through the metallic objects originating from the bag and the
threat object in the 3D CT TIP volume (benign bag with the
threat object). CT metal artefacts emerging from the metallic
objects spread across these lines. In order to generate metal
artefacts in the benign bag CT volume, the projection bins in
the marked mask in the benign bag sinogram are thus made
inconsistent with their neighbourhood unlike MAR projection-
replacement based methods in which the projection bins in this
mask are replaced by interpolated data. The underlying idea
behind this is to mimic real CT scanning of a metal object
by making the sinogram values corrupted and inconsistent
with their neighbourhood if the corresponding X-rays have
intersected the metal object. In fact, since metal objects are
high-attenuation objects, they heavily attenuate the X-ray
beams and consequently, only a few photons reach the scanner
detectors. This effect known as photon starvation effect indeed
produces corrupted data in the sinogram and gives rise to
artefacts in the reconstructed 2D and 3D images. In order to
corrupt the projection bins of the marked mask in the benign
bag sinogram, we have used an empirical function as follows:
s′ij = (1− q)× sij + q × smax, sij ∈ Smarked (13)
7where sij and s′ij are the benign bag sinogram values within
the marked mask before and after being corrupted, respec-
tively; smask is the maximum value of benign bag sinogram
in the marked mask region; q is a hyper-parameter empirically
set to 0.2 in our experiments. As we will show shortly,
by following the above steps, consistent metal artefacts are
generated within the bag CT volumes which are a function of
the scan orientation of the bag, the material of the bag content
and the material of the inserted threat object. As depicted in
Figure 5, once the metal artefacts are generated in the Radon
space, the resulting modified sinogram is re-projected back
into the CT domain. The resulting reconstructed CT volume
corresponds to the original benign bag CT volume corrupted
by metal artefacts originating from the threat object metal part
and the benign bag metal objects. The final 3D TIP volume
is obtained by combining the resulting CT volume with the
artefact free threat object CT volume.
Fig. 5. Flow chart of our MAG method depicted using 2D CT slices
IV. EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS
In this section, experiments are conducted to evaluate the
effectiveness of the proposed approach for 3D TIP in baggage
CT imagery. In our experiments, the constant value c in Eq.
(2) is set to 100 and the constant value c′ in Eq. (6) is set to
10. As a result, voxels with intensity values higher than 410
Fig. 6. Threat volume segmentation results. Rows from top to bottom: bottle,
bottle, handgun and submachine gun. Columns from left to right: original
volumes, indicator matrix volumes (defined in Eq. (1)) and segmented threat
volumes.
(i.e. 10/100×4096) will be penalised in the particle swarm
optimisation. Values of λ1 and λ2 in Eq. (5) are empirically
set to 0.01 and 1 respectively. For each component of the
framework, we present some exemplar results in Figures 6-
12 for qualitative performance evaluation. We further generate
a large number of TIP using real baggage volumes from an
airport for quantitative evaluations.
A. Qualitative Evaluations
Figure 6 shows some exemplary threat volume segmentation
results using our proposed algorithm. The original threat
volumes of two bottles (in the first two rows) and two firearms
(handgun in the third row and submachine gun in the fourth
row) are displayed in the left column where he background
and noises could be observed. The middle column shows the
results of our segmentation algorithm indicated by the 3D
matrix defined in Eq. (1), where the threat body regions are
coloured in yellow, background regions in white and uncertain
regions in grey. The segmented threat volumes are shown in
the right column from which we can see the background and
noises are removed.
Figure 7 shows bag volume segmentation results using the
proposed algorithm. Five different original bag volumes are
displayed in the top row and their corresponding segmentation
results are shown in the bottom row. The segmentation results
are represented by the 3D projection cost maps defined in Eq.
(2), where regions of inner-void, bag-content and background
8Original bags
Void region map
Fig. 7. Baggage volume segmentation results. Top row: original baggage CT volumes; bottom row: projection cost volume defined in Eq. (2) with the green
colour representing void regions and the red color representing regions having high projection cost.
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TIP
Fig. 8. An exemplar threat image projection (TIP) result where a bottle signature is inserted into a suitcase. Three orthogonal views are shown in three
columns. Views of the original baggage and the resultant TIP are shown in the top and bottom rows respectively.
are coloured in green, red and white respectively. The bag
segmentation results in Figure 7 indicate our algorithm is able
to readily locate accurate bag boundaries as well as the void
regions inside the bags.
The results of threat volume projection are shown in Figures
8-11. We visualize the resultant 3D TIP volumes with three
orthogonal views in three columns. The first row shows
views of the original benign baggage and the TIP results
with threat signatures inserted are shown in the second row.
We can see that the threat signatures can be successfully
projected into the baggage regardless of the volumes and
shapes of the threats and baggage. This attributes to a robust
segmentation algorithm for threat and baggage segmentation.
Specifically, Figure 8 shows a TIP result with a bottle projected
into a cluttered suitcase. Our approach has been successfully
discovered the optimal insertion location and orientation and
generated a plausible TIP volume. Figure 9 shows a TIP result
with a small bottle into a backpack. Although the lack of void
region in the original backpack, our algorithm projects the
bottle signature into a low-intensity region (orange colour).
As a result, the inserted bottle looks like being surrounded by
organic materials (e.g., clothes) and very realistic. In figure
10, the signature of a small handgun is inserted to a baggage
and Figure 11 shows the TIP result with a submachine gun
signature inserted into a very cluttered suitcase. In summary,
with satisfying results of threat and bag volume segmentation,
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Fig. 9. An exemplar threat image projection (TIP) result where a small bottle signature is inserted into a suitcase. Three orthogonal views are shown in three
columns. Views of the original baggage and the resultant TIP are shown in the top and bottom rows respectively.
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Fig. 10. An exemplar threat image projection (TIP) result where a handgun signature is inserted into a suitcase. Three orthogonal views are shown in three
columns. Views of the original baggage and the resultant TIP are shown in the top and bottom rows respectively.
the particle swarm optimisation algorithm is able to find
the optimal position and orientation for the insertion hence
plausible TIP could be generated as shown in Figures 8-11.
To evaluate the performance of the proposed metal artefact
generation algorithm, we present two examples in Figure 12.
Selected slices of the original bag volumes are shown in the
first row. Corresponding slices of the TIP without and with
MAG are shown in the second and third rows respectively.
We can see that slices with MAG in the third row look more
realistic in the region of metal objects due to the generation
of artefact streaks.
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Fig. 11. An exemplar threat image projection (TIP) result where a submachine gun signature is inserted into a suitcase. Three orthogonal views are shown
in three columns. Views of the original baggage and the resultant TIP are shown in the top and bottom rows respectively.
Benign bag slice
TIP slice
TIP slice with MAG
Fig. 12. Exemplar results of metal artefact generation (MAG). Two examples
are shown in the left and right columns respectively. Rows from top to bottom:
slices of benign bag CT volumes; corresponding slices of TIP volumes without
MAG; corresponding slices of TIP volumes with MAG.
B. Quantitative Evaluations
We design two experiments to evaluate the proposed TIP ap-
proach quantitatively. The first experiment aims to investigate
the consistency of TIP quality scores with human evaluations.
In Eq. (11), a monotonically decreasing function is used in
our experiment. We select 150 generated TIP volumes from
a large number of candidates and the scores of selected TIP
volumes are evenly distributed in the range of 0 − 100. We
use a 3D CT volume visualisation tool to visually inspect
each TIP volume and categorize it into one of three classes
(i.e. good, medium and bad) according to their quality. A TIP
volume is defined as good if the threat signature is perfectly
inserted into a void region within the bag volume and visually
realistic and plausible. A TIP volume is labelled as bad if
it is obviously unrealistic, for example, the threat signature
is inserted outside the bag or intercepted by other items in
the bag. A TIP volume of medium quality is not perfect but
the flaw can only be spotted by careful inspection after the
considerable time (> 2 minutes). As a result, there are 102,
37 and 11 TIP volumes labeled as good, medium and bad
respectively. It is noteworthy this ratio is not a performance
reflection of our TIP approach since we deliberately select low
score TIP to look into the relationship between TIP scores and
TIP qualities in this experiment. We calculate the mean and
standard deviation of the scores for the TIP volumes falling
in each class and the results are 82.8 ± 23.2, 69.8 ± 36.1
and 45.7 ± 48.1, respectively. In general, the proposed TIP
quality scores are consistent with human evaluation results in
terms of mean values. On the other hand, however, we also
can see large standard deviations of the quality scores for all
three classes. It is indicated that the TIP quality score is not
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Fig. 13. Examples of good, medium and bad TIP volumes: (a) TIP of good quality; (b) TIP of medium quality due to the interception of the magazine into
a mug (highlighted in red circle); (c) TIP of bad quality due to the insertion outside the bag.
perfectly reliable for TIP quality evaluation. As a result, we
need to set a high score threshold to reject TIP of bad quality
in practice which unavoidably will also falsely reject some
good ones.
In the second experiment, we randomly select 100 generated
TIP volumes and manually label each of them as the class
of good, medium or bad based on visual inspection. As a
result, 92% of the TIP volumes are good, 6% are medium
and only 2% of them are bad. These results demonstrate that
our proposed TIP approach is able to generate TIP volumes
of good quality with a very high plausibility and realism
acceptance rate.
V. DISCUSSION
In this section, we discuss the limitations of our proposed
approach and potential solutions to addressing them in future
work. Specifically, we discuss three aspects: preconditions,
hyper-parameters and failure cases.
The behaviours of our approach rely heavily on values of
many hyper-parameters such as threshold values in volume
segmentation and insertion location optimisation. Although
the approach is generally robust to most parameters hence
performs well as illustrated without exhaustive parameter
tuning, there is a subset we need to take special care with
when applying this approach to CT volumes captured with
different scanners. This is due to the considerable variability
of voxel value ranges and noise levels of CT machines from
different manufacturers or even different models from the same
manufacturer.
One parameter we need to adjust for specific scanners is
the threshold value for binarization in the first step of void
determination (c.f. Figure 3). This threshold determines the
accuracy of bag boundary. We are aware that if this threshold
value is too small, the noise surrounding the bag would be
mistakenly treated as part of the bag. As a result, a region
outside the bag could be potentially treated as inner void and
be the place where threats are inserted in. This would make
the resultant TIP obviously unrealistic. One way to addressing
this issue is to set this threshold value higher, which, however,
could mistakenly remove voxels of bag boundaries since the
materials of bag surfaces usually have low intensities in
CT volumes. Fortunately, this kind of TIP artefact is more
acceptable compared with the former one (i.e. inserting threats
outside a bag). We, therefore, suggest a great value rather than
a small one for the threshold of binarization in bag volume
segmentation.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we propose an approach to 3D threat image
projection for X-ray CT volumes. Qualitative and quantitative
evaluations prove that our TIP approach is able to generate
realistic and plausible 3D baggage CT volumes containing
fictional threat signatures which can be widely used for
training baggage screening operators or automatic threat de-
tection models extending of [24]. In our future work, we will
investigate how the deep convolutional neural networks can be
employed and benefit the performance of bag and threat image
segmentation in our TIP approach. On the other hand, it will be
more interesting to investigate how the generated TIP volumes
could benefit the training of automatic threat detection models
as one type of data augmentation strategy [8].
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